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employees and hearing their complaints
about intrusive government and high
taxes. Though he had spent years in the
film industry, this contact with lowerand middle-class Americans rubbed off
some of the Hollywood veneer and had
the added benefit of teaching him what
worked and what didn’t in trying to appeal to the “common man.” By 1980,
millions of these “common men” would
become known as “Reagan Democrats.”
Yet perhaps most importantly, it was
during his employment with GE that
Reagan robustly embraced a political
ideology of free markets, limited government, and anticommunism. Evans
believes that Reagan’s GE experience
was his “apprenticeship for public life”
and his “postgraduate education in political science.” The author argues that
GE’s vice president, Lemuel Boulware
(who directed the aforementioned campaign against the union bosses of the
era), was Reagan’s mentor in his conservative apprenticeship. By 1964 Ronald Reagan had publicly come out of his
New Deal closet (he voted in 1960 as a
“Democrat for Nixon”), but neither he
nor the company was anxious to publicize the impact of his GE years on his
conversion.
This work has all the flair of a government report on agriculture subsidies,
and the author occasionally overstates
the impact of Reagan’s GE experience
(according to Evans, it was when the
seeds for the Iran-Contra scandal and
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative
were planted). Nonetheless, Thomas
Evans’s book is the best kind of history
and biography, in that it explores a
facet of a statesman’s life that tends to
be overlooked, especially, in this instance, by historians and political

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011

scientists with tin ears for the world of
business.
STEPHEN F. KNOTT

Naval War College

Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy.
New York: Viking Penguin, 2009. 591pp. $32.95

The 6 June 1944 Normandy invasion
has received ample research over the
years, with works by such noted historians as Cornelius Ryan, Stephen E.
Ambrose, and Max Hastings. Known as
Operation OVERLORD, it was by all accounts a pivotal event of the war in Europe. Hindsight clearly shows that
ending Hitler’s control of Europe required the Allies to meet the Wehrmacht
in the field in mainland Europe.
So what can another book add to the
canon on Normandy? Antony Beevor’s
meticulously written and researched
D-Day: The Battle for Normandy might
at first blush appear to be simply another treatise on the famed battle. Yet
anyone who believes this to be so without reading it will miss out on sweeping
narrative and credible research.
Beevor minces no words in telling the
story of this grand operation, the epitome of Allied wartime cooperation and
a daunting plan to develop and execute.
There is no shortage of controversies
and points of debate, which Beevor meticulously brings out again and again. A
fellow countryman, General Sir Bernard
Montgomery, his famous ego well documented, comes in for pointed criticism for decisions and actions he made
throughout the battle. In fact, both Allied and German military leaders face
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Beevor’s scrutiny. The Americans, fixated on securing a port facility for logistical support, learned the hard way that
the entrenched German garrison in
Brest could hold out for a very long
time. Despite a highly sophisticated
air-ground coordination and the commitment of VIII Corps, the Americans
had to pay dearly to pry Brest from resolute and determined German defenders
—blood spilled for a port that in the end
was never used.
Beevor is a well known historian of
twentieth-century combat, one who
knows his topic, capably weaves the
broad sweep of the Normandy campaign into a compelling account, and
provides the broader context, bringing
in aspects of the battle that until recently have received short shrift. For example, he presents an excellent account
of the battles fought by the Polish 1st
Armored Division. Also, he shows the
critical role of the 20 July assassination
attempt against Hitler in how the German leadership responded to the relentless Allied onslaught. The subsequent
hunt for conspirators wreaked havoc
with the German military’s ability to
wage a cohesive and effective defense
and helped set up the eventual Allied
breakout and defeat of the Wehrmacht
in France by the end of the summer.
Without a doubt, the battle for France
in 1944 saw some of the most ferocious
and savage fighting to take place in the
European theater. There was the unrelenting fight by Montgomery to take
Caen, which was won at great cost—
Allied bombing during Operation
GOODWOOD ultimately reduced the
town to rubble. Seeing Caen as pivotal
to the security of the beachhead, D-Day
planners expected to have it in Allied
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hands by the end of 6 June, but it did
not fall until mid-July. Beevor makes
the case that British sluggishness allowed a vast portion of the German
army to escape the Falaise Pocket—
German soldiers who would live to
fight the Allies another day.
A constant thread throughout his book
is the high cost paid by French citizens
for the liberation of their land. Nearly
twenty thousand French civilians died
during the liberation of Normandy, in
addition to the estimated fifteen thousand killed and nineteen thousand injured during the preliminary bombing.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE
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Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order:
From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution.
New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2011. 585pp.
$35

Two decades ago scholars, government
policy makers, and military cold warriors struggled to decipher the meaning
of the sudden and drastic change happening in the Soviet bloc. Francis
Fukuyama now offers a provocative approach to this puzzle, which has been
widely debated and perhaps misunderstood ever since. He cautiously asked in
The End of History and the Last Man
(1992) “whether, at the end of the
twentieth century, it makes sense for us
once again to speak of a coherent and
directional History of mankind that will
eventually lead the greater part of humanity to liberal democracy.” Fukuyama
went on to theorize that the fall of
communism represented a great step
forward in mankind’s struggle for
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